Subtitle: A Full-Chain Investigation into AKAS, OLY, and LynkCoDAO
You will never know how many hidden backdoors exist in the “project teams” you trust.
To all Chinese-speaking communities: read this article before deciding whether to “ape in.”
Over the past year, a mysterious team operating under the banners of “DAO,” “decentralization,” and “treasury-backed systems” has launched three consecutive projects: AKAS, OLY, and LynkCoDAO. They appeared polished, conceptual, and grand on the surface. But what happened behind the scenes was jaw-dropping.
The most shocking part?
After the first three projects collapsed, the same team is now preparing a fourth launch: CryptoDAO (V3 PRO).
Is this an upgrade— or a continuation?
More likely— a fourth round of extraction.
Three Consecutive Collapses Were Not Coincidence — They Were the “Model”
Compare the three projects for just a moment and you will notice a chilling pattern:
- The same “treasury-backed” narrative
- The same claims of “revoked permissions”
- The same controllable minting structure
- The same late-night critical operations
- The same instant price crashes
New packaging, same core.
Is this a DAO— or a three-part trap wearing a DAO mask?
AKAS: The First Cut — Executed Without Mercy
The promotional narrative said one thing; the actual implementation was another.
- “1 USDT mints 1 token” became minting tens of thousands per transaction
- Large-scale late-night minting
- Massive dumping on the secondary market
- The “treasury” controlled by a private wallet
The first harvest was swift and brutal.
Within this four-project system, AKAS is the key starting point. Without understanding AKAS, you cannot understand why the next two collapses were inevitable. At the beginning, no one in the community realized that AKAS quietly buried all the structural risks that detonated later.
AKAS launched at a perfect moment in the market.
They said:
“ We are building a decentralized, National treasury-backed system.”
“ 1 USDT can only mint 1 AS.”
“ This is a sustainable, transparent, and fair DAO.”
The branding carried a solemn, almost “savior-like” tone. Many in the community—including experienced players—were attracted. The sentiment was simple:
“Finally, a team that isn’t here to cash-grab.”
But within days, everything unraveled.
Users soon discovered that AKAS minted tens of thousands of tokens daily into its staking pool, including cases where 10 USDT minted 32,000 AS—a complete betrayal of the promised “1 USDT = 1 AS” model.
This detail was fatal.
If the team could mint freely, then:
- “Treasury backing”
- “Scarcity”
- “1:1 minting”
were nothing but slogans—exposing malicious intent. In the following days, on-chain data repeatedly showed:
- scheduled minting
- minting every day
- minting in massive amounts
- executed by the same address
There was no transparency, no governance votes, no automated triggers. All minting was manually executed. In the decentralized world, uncontrolled manual minting equals:
“the token has no upper bound,”
“the system has no security boundary.”
Yet the community still tried to rationalize:
“Maybe they’re subsidizing the pool.”
“Maybe they’re hedging risk.”
“Maybe these are rewards.”
No one wanted to face reality:
AKAS minting and dumping were entirely at the discretion of the project team.
On September 21, at around 5 a.m., on-chain data showed:
- four consecutive minting transactions
- each extremely large
- totaling 280,000 AS
These tokens were dumped starting September 24. This was the first time the team minted and dumped directly on the market.
When questioned by the community, the team stopped pretending. They began dumping using multiple pre-prepared addresses—resulting in the September 26 dump.
Prices collapsed and never recovered. Chinese-speaking team leaders were restricted from withdrawing or selling, told to “defend the price,” but the chart only kept bleeding. Those who reacted slowly became “boiled leeks”—unable to flee, trapped by the team’s promises.
The chart resembled the worst low-tier meme coins; the behavior was predatory.
OLY: The Second Cut — This Time Targeting “Leaders”
After AKAS collapsed, its impact moved to the second project—OLY.
With terms like “early bird slots,” “internal rounds,” and “core airdrops,” the bait sounded sweet but was poison in disguise.
- Permissions were “abandoned,” yet somehow still operable later
- Liquidity pool transfers layered repeatedly
- The minting logic remained unchanged
And the result? The same catastrophic price crash.
This time, the targets were not just community members— but leaders.
If AKAS was the “template,” OLY was the second precisely executed harvest. And this time, the objective was clear: not the community, but the leaders—because harvesting leaders means harvesting their entire teams.
When AKAS faced minting scandals and late-night dumps, the community panicked. But the team quietly refocused on a specific group: leaders with influence, networks, and followers.
“You are our core. We will give you better opportunities.”
This line broke leaders’ defenses.
The team told AKAS leaders:
“We’re fixing AKAS issues, but here’s a more stable system.”
“You will receive guaranteed early positions.”
“This one is exclusively for leaders who supported us.”
“This will be fairer and stronger than AKAS.”
But the product was simply repackaged AKAS. Before OLY launched, the team announced:
“We have burned all permissions. The token is fully decentralized.”
Leaders took this as an assurance. But on launch day, on-chain actions proved otherwise: Permission supposedly “burned” was somehow still capable of changing the tax rate from 99% to 3%. Even CertiK flagged OLY for multiple hidden functions.
The result:
Leaders paid dearly for their misjudgment. The price collapsed repeatedly—just as planned. Those who thought they had an advantage ultimately became prime targets for the team’s well-sharpened scythe.
LynkCoDAO: The Third Cut — A Brutal, Community-Wide Killshot
If AKAS and OLY allowed any room for doubt, LynkCoDAO removed all ambiguity.
On October 18 at 1:18 a.m., one address executed:
- six consecutive minting transactions
- 1.4 million tokens each
- totaling 8.4 million
Immediately after minting, they dumped directly into the liquidity pool. The price fell from 25 USDT to 0.04 within moments. The community didn’t even have time to ask “what happened”— it was over.
Simultaneously, the “treasury” was drained.
The chart formed a complete collapse—a disgrace even among DAO-type projects. Community analysts comparing the three charts quickly recognized:
This was premeditated. A trap engineered to hunt uninformed and greedy leaders.
The treasury, supposedly used for “price support,” saw multiple large transfers to private wallets—coincidentally matching the mint-and-dump amounts (1.4 million each). No attempt was made to mask the behavior.
Early leaders who had trusted the AKAS team? Their money was being siphoned right in front of them.
The community asked:
“How can liquidity be locked but still be drained?”
“Wasn’t the treasury supposed to support the price?”
“How can manual minting go straight into the pool? Wasn’t it automatic?”
But the facts were simple:
❗ Minting contract not open-source
❗ Permissions never actually revoked
❗ Treasury held in a single-signature wallet
❗ Minting controlled by private addresses
❗ All mint() actions manually executed
This system could self-destruct at any time. Externally the pool looked “locked,” but internally it was riddled with backdoors. Why did LynkCoDAO collapse so violently?
Because compared with AKAS and OLY:
- Leaders no longer trusted them
- Communities were questioning
- The model was harder to sustain
- Pools were shrinking
- The time window was shorter
So, the third cut could not be slow. It had to be immediate.
The faster the collapse:
- The less time leaders had to react
- The less time doubts could spread
- The fewer defenses communities could mount
- The less warning other groups received
- The sooner the team could launch the fourth project
The three events expose one truth: The so-called “DAO” was only a costume. The reality was total centralized control.
Shared high-risk traits:
- closed-source minting contracts
- permissions never truly relinquished
- no multi-signature treasury
- private wallets executing minting
- fabricated price-support logic
- ability to crash the market at will
Comparing AKAS, OLY One, and LynkCoDAO Leads to One Conclusion
These were not independent projects. They were built from the same template, using identical permission structures, identical minting mechanisms, and collapsing with nearly identical timing.
This consistency is not coincidence — it is strategy.
✔ AKAS: repeated manual minting and major dumps
✔ OLY One: “burned permissions” still able to modify tax rates
✔ LynkCoDAO: private-address minting and instant collapses
The first three cuts are still bleeding, yet the fourth—CryptoDAO (V3 PRO)—is already being raised.
The Fourth Project: CryptoDAO (V3 PRO)
After three catastrophic collapses, the same team is now promoting a fourth project. And even more absurd— many Chinese communities are already encountering promotional materials:
- “The best encounter yet”
- “Upgraded open-source RBS”
- “Team relations fully on-chain”
- “This time truly decentralized”
- “V3 Pro is a completely different structure”
But we must ask:
Have the issues of the previous projects been resolved?
Has any post-mortem work been done?
Has any explanation been given for the fund flows?
If not—
Why should the fourth be trusted?
Why wouldn’t the same script repeat?
A Critical Warning to Domestic Investors
🚫 1. Do not touch any project where permissions are not truly revoked.
🚫 2. Do not touch teams launching new projects without addressing previous failures.
🚫 3. Do not touch systems that lure leaders with “exclusive early positions.”
Conclusion
CryptoDAO (V3 PRO) is not a new opportunity.
It is:
the fourth cycle of a triple-collapse system.
If domestic communities fail to recognize this team’s true nature, the fourth cut may not hurt any less than the first three.
Stay alert—and share this article with everyone around you. No matter how beautiful the packaging, it cannot cover the bloodstains left on-chain.
